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Temporarily New: On Low Fertility and the 
Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 




Concern about the low levels of fertility in Europe appears to be spreading. In 
political circles voices advocating the design and implementation of pro-natal 
policies are growing louder. The traditional fear of population decline is re-
fuelled in numerous conference papers and at meetings specifically set up to let 
policymakers meet demographic experts. This paper aims to contribute to the 
discussion by arguing that just as in the 1930s, and in the early 1970s when 
fertility first dropped below replacement level, expressed concerns do not 
necessarily lead to pro-natal policies. After a brief discussion of the raisons 
d’êtres of governments, and of the purposes and types of population policies, a 
series of propositions is presented that make it reasonable, at the very least 
understandable, that democratically elected governments act with great prudence 
in such matters. Their basic policy goals are not endangered and they are faced 
with other more serious priorities. Europe’s past has mainly yielded lamentable 
examples, the position of national administrations vis-à-vis their population has 
changed so that fertility is largely beyond governmental control, and it is probably 
wrong to assume that the common difference between mean desired family size 
and completed family size is essentially due to the lack of support for families. It 
is concluded that concern about numbers may be a temporary phenomenon and 
that in many ways it makes more sense for governments to invest heavily in the 
children that are being born. 
   
1  Introduction 
 
Demographers projecting the population of their country are seldom pleased with 
the outcome. Given the best assumptions about future trends that can be made 
they see serious problems arising from growth that is either too rapid or too slow 
and from changes in the population structure. Demanding government action and 
suggesting specific policies is but one step away. Few resist that temptation. But 
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while demographers may be right in their diagnosis that as a consequence of 
specific demographic trends serious geo-political, social and economic issues 
loom ahead, the response of governments tends to remain vocal and in practice is 
slow and half-hearted at best. I will argue that even in the present situation of 
lowest-low fertility in industrialised countries this political reaction is appropriate, 
at the very least understandable. There are very good reasons for governments to 
be prudent in re-allocating resources for pro-natal purposes. This partly, because 
they have even more pressing matters at hand and partly because it must be 
assumed that the demographic regime change underway since the mid-1960s has 
not yet come to an end. Moreover, the same forces underlying that regime change, 
and by implication the shift to lowest-low fertility, have changed the relationship 
between the government and the people. The traditional political and 
administrative operating system has become obsolete. Governments are no longer 
in a position to use an advantage in knowledge and power to formulate generic 
policies and solutions and to enforce these. Increasing the official age at 
retirement by two years, for example, requires spreading it out over several 
decades. In the reflexive modern, newly unordered societies experiencing the 
effects of the regime change frequently called the Second Demographic 
Transition, subtle approaches are required. Consequently, the demographers’ 
focus on the pressing need for strong, explicit pro-natal policies will remain only 
temporarily ‘new’. 
 
2  What are National Governments for? 
 
National governments fulfill a multitude of tasks. Commonly their existence is 
taken for granted. But what are the most essential raisons-d’être of national 
governments?  They have two basic responsibilities. A national government has: 
 
- To maintain the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the state, and 
should  
- Aim to improve the quality of life and wellbeing of the population it 
represents. 
 
How these two basic responsibilities are translated into the main goals, or 
primary objectives, pursued by government departments depends on a variety of 
factors. They may be largely religiously inspired, may have a theoretical 
foundation, or may use a specific ideology as point of departure. Invariably such a 
set of objectives will be abstract in character and will reflect the interplay of 
competing societal forces. The precise nature of that set of goals is commonly 
ascertained by studying the objectives stated in the policy papers of different 
government departments and by looking at the allocation of tasks over such 
departments. To expect all objectives to be fully compatible is unrealistic. The Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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goal of assuring a high rate of economic growth may come into conflict with the 
goal of protecting the environment. Similarly, the explicit objective of enlarging 
the opportunities of each individual to lead a meaningful life and to follow a life 
course of one’s personal choice may easily clash with the goal of maintaining a 
fair social order. The objective of wanting to contribute to peace and security in 
the world may be interpreted differently by the departments of foreign affairs and 
defense. And it requires little imagination to see that there may even be instances 
in which maintaining the national sovereignty is disadvantageous for the long-
term economic welfare of a population. 
 
3  What are Population Policies for? 
 
Population policies, however defined, can never be a goal in themselves. They are 
best characterised as being secondary in nature. They are not formulated simply 
because there is a population. No, they have to serve the realisation of the basic 
and primary policy objectives as discussed above. 
Following Doublet (1949), Berelson (1971; 1974) has distinguished three 
groups of policy measures that jointly constitute the population policy of a 
country. These are (i) measures that aim to exert a direct influence on 
demographic events such as fertility, mortality and migration, or that have a direct 
bearing on the size, composition, or distribution of the population; (ii) measures 
which although not formulated with demographic intent are cognizant of their 
likely demographic effects, and (iii) measures which although not taken with 
demographic intent have, or are assumed to have, non-negligible demographic 
effects.   
Changes in population policy emanate from changes in demographic 
conditions or prospects, from changes in the social and economic circumstances 
of a country, from changes in national policy goals, or from a combination of 
these. Currently it is mainly the almost unprecedented low level of period fertility 
that stimulates quite a few demographers of repute to ring the alarm bell and to 
call upon their governments to take immediate action to increase the number of 
children born per woman. They demand urgent policy measures of the first type 
that will exert, or are supposed to exert, a direct influence on the level of fertility 
and, consequently, on the rate of natural population growth and the age structure. 
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4  Why is Prudence Appropriate? 
 
One may list a variety of reasons that make it understandable why in the current 
setting governments of the industrialised countries of Europe and in other 
industrialised parts of the world are reluctant to introduce explicit pro-natal 
policies. These can be grouped as follows: 
 
Basic policy goals not endangered 
The continuation of lowest-low levels of fertility for any length of time will 
inevitably have geopolitical repercussions. This is particularly evident when 
population projections for European countries are contrasted with similar 
estimates made for selected countries elsewhere in the world (Demeny 2003). But 
that does not imply that the basic objective of maintaining national sovereignty 
and the territorial integrity of the state is endangered. To serve that goal one 
simply needs power. As Organsky and Organsky stated in the early 1960s when 
concern about the diverging population trends in the various parts of the world 
was equally great, it is naïve to equate power with military might and population 
numbers. It includes ‘…the power to influence the quiet course of peaceful 
events. Power is the ability to influence the thoughts and behaviour of others. All 
nations have this ability to some extent, and all are constantly exercising it in one 
way or another’ (Organsky and Organsky 1961: 9). 
  The determinants of national power are manifold. Population numbers 
have been identified as being important in that regard (Davis 1958). For one they 
are the principal factor in the labour force, are highly relevant for the size of the 
economy of a country, also directly influence the potential size of the fighting 
forces, while ‘… consolidation of a victory in war often requires a sizeable 
occupation force’. But power is not merely a question of numbers. 
The power of nations is also seen to be closely related to their wealth. In fact, 
on an earlier occasion, Davis (1954) had already concluded that the power of a 
country was best measured in terms of its GNP. In the course of time further 
elements have been added and specified, such as the skill and efficiency of the 
government, size of territory, geographical location, natural resources, growth 
rate, levels of education, civilian morale, political ideology and willingness to 
suffer. In the mid-1970s Cline (1975) made an attempt to study the ‘politectonics’ 
in the world, as he called it, more systematically. He developed an approach that I 
have not seen improved and that defines the Perceived power (Pp) of a country or 
region as a function of its Critical mass (C), Economic capability (E), Military 
capability (M), Strategic purpose (S) and Will to pursue a national strategy (W). 
In his formula Pp= (C+E+M) x (S+W) population size forms part of C (the 
critical mass) but can contribute at most 10% to the total value of the Pp of a 
given state or region.     
One need not fully subscribe to Cline’s approach to appreciate that population 
size per se is not such an important determinant of power, that raising fertility to Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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replacement level or above would not be a suitable way to counteract the strategic 
drift inherent in the diverging population trends in the various parts of the world. 
This even if it is assumed, that an increase in fertility and natural growth rates 
would also have a positive effect on other determinants of power. The individual 
industrialised countries in the European region affected by lowest-low fertility 
have little choice but to band together so as to become less vulnerable and to 
conclude treaties that may afford protection. This process is, in fact, well under 
way. Both NATO and the European Union have extended beyond belief and 
while in the European region the integration is experiencing setbacks the 
expansion is bound to continue. Turkey may well join within two decades and so 
may the Ukraine, the Balkan states currently out of favour, and ultimately even 
Russia. The paradoxical conclusion can be no other than that for states which 
because of their small population size will never be a major force in the world, the 
best way to preserve their territorial integrity may well be to transfer part of their 
national sovereignty to a supra-national entity.     
Will the second basic goal of maintaining and enhancing the quality of life of 
their populations also remain possible in countries with very low fertility if it is 
not raised? To give a categorical answer is not possible. All one can say is that, so 
far, growth in GDP per capita in the OECD countries has continued. It is true that 
during 1990-98 that rate of growth was slightly lower than during 1980-90 (1.8 
versus 2.1%) but that reflects an economic recession rather than a demographic 
effect. In 2004 the GDP per capita in 30 OECD countries, based on current 
purchasing power, amounted to USD 27 800, an average negatively affected by 
the low levels still observed in some eastern European countries. Given that 
disposable incomes have continually risen, such economic and structural 
problems as exist in the OECD countries can hardly be attributed to reduced rates 
of natural population growth or declining population numbers. Much depends, 
furthermore, on the precise definition of the concept ‘quality of life’. In a paper 
prepared for a conference on declining fertility in Europe organised by the 
Council of Europe in 1976 I have argued that it depends on the degree to which 
three groups of human needs are fulfilled: “…  the primary needs, which are 
essentially physiological and economic, for example housing, clothing, food; the 
secondary needs which are essentially social, for example security, dignity, 
justice; and the tertiary needs which are essentially of a cultural nature, for 
example, the need to participate, to be creative, to achieve self-fulfillment and 
harmony” (Van de Kaa 1978: 226-7). Economic forecasts commonly foresee a 
further, sometimes even quite substantial, increase in GDP per capita. There is no 
doubt that if lowest-low fertility were to persist for an extended period of time 
and no significant recuperation due to postponement were to occur this could 
affect the (rising) standard of living of the populations concerned. That is to say, 
certain groups in these populations could see their relative standard of living 
decline. Not that single mothers, the aged and the chronically ill would suffer 
abject poverty, but it would become increasingly difficult for governments to On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 
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raise the funds required to maintain and cover all age-related social and welfare 
benefits. The messages governments receive from economists in this regard are, 
however, not unequivocal.
1 Some prefer to stress the advantages also associated 
with it.  
Moreover, depending on the degree of foresight displayed by the different 
governments and on anticipatory measures already taken the magnitude of such 
difficulties will vary. If proper pension schemes relying partly on capital 
investment and partly on pay-as-you-go arrangements are in place and the 
governments themselves have built up a sizeable reserve they will not be serious. 
If governance has been poor the situation is quite different. But the magnitude of 
the problems will even then depend largely on how well these governments will 
deal with the need for structural economic and social reforms they are confronted 
with. Without major structural reform the economic future of most industrialised 
countries in the West is bleak. Then they will not be able to improve their 
economic performance and will not reach an annual rate of economic growth in 
the order of 3% that would allow the absorption of many of the consequences of 
ageing. This makes carrying out structural reforms a much greater priority than 
the issue of low fertility. Moreover, to the extent that stagnant economic growth is 
implicated in the decline of fertility, prioritising economic revival might well help 
to redress it. In countries rich in natural resources, such as Australia (ores, 
minerals, coal), the Netherlands (gas), and Norway (oil), which can count on 
deriving large incomes from the sale of these products, the situation is easier. If 
they are willing to channel part of that income to covering rising pension and 
social security costs they may be able to avoid having to increase the ratio of total 
tax revenue to gross domestic product (GDP). Within the 30-nation OECD area 
that ratio has fallen slightly, from 37.1 % in 2000 to 36.3 % in 2003, but it may 
well be argued that the overall share of taxation in the economies of the region is 
still too high in the globalisation that the region faces. 
The most difficult constellation of factors and the most serious societal 
consequences must, of course, be expected in countries affected by both very low 
fertility and poor governance. Would not pro-natal policies be appropriate there? 
Perhaps, but while the poorest and most under-privileged groups of the population 
in such countries may well be responsive to pro-natal policies, these countries are 
precisely the countries least likely to be able to afford them and also to implement 
them successfully, with efficacy and fairness.    
                                                 
1     It may be a national idiosyncrasy, but the main economic advisor of the Netherlands, the 
director of the Central Planning Office, Henk Don, recently stated in a newspaper interview 
that a declining population was not an ‘economic problem’ (NRC, 09-02-06). Several months 
earlier, Joop Hartog, a professor of economy at the University of Amsterdam, confessed in the 
same journal to breaking out in sweat when he hears colleagues advocate measures to promote 
births. He argues that the income per capita does not depend on the number of heads, and sees 
more advantages than disadvantages in having a smaller national population.  Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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Structural reforms have priority over pro-natal policies 
It is generally recognised that the industrialised countries of the West, and 
particularly those in Europe, face a number of structural challenges. The 
persistence of sluggish economic growth in most OECD countries, in the 
European Union, and the Euro zone understandably has created a good deal of 
uneasiness and uncertainty about the economic prospects in the region. It has 
sapped consumer confidence. The diagnosis is fairly straightforward. The region 
is increasingly affected by developments elsewhere in the world and feels the 
impact of what is loosely called globalisation. According to Blossfeld and Mills 
(2005) that process comprises four interrelated shifts: 
1. The swift internationalisation of markets after the end of the Cold War; 
2. The rapid intensification of competition following deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation within industrialised countries; 
3. The accelerated diffusion of knowledge and the spread of networks 
connecting markets around the globe; 
4. The increasing impact of these markets at the national level and their 
dependence on events that may happen anywhere in the world. 
 
Together these shifts have mercilessly exposed the weaknesses of the 
European and similar economies. Siebert (2005) who investigated ways of getting 
Germany’s economic engine going again identified three major challenges. These 
are to ‘undo the false incentives that are the root cause of high unemployment’, 
‘how to reduce the tax on labour and how to make the social security systems 
sustainable’ and, more generally, ‘how to get a more dynamic economy’. These 
challenges are to varying degrees common to all western European countries. The 
welfare states of the Western world apparently are vulnerable: their labour market 
is too rigid and does not allow easy firing and hiring; the skills and motivation of 
part of the labour force do not match current demand; the system of wage 
negotiations is not flexible enough and too centralised; the gap between gross and 
net hourly wages is much too large and drives firms out; the level of taxation is 
too high and certainly cannot be raised any further; the number of working hours 
in Europe is too small when compared to the USA let alone in comparison to 
newly developing countries—1276 working hours in 2003 in the USA versus 934 
in Germany—(Brouwer 2005); unemployment and other social benefits are too 
generous; not enough is invested in research, innovation and development; the 
integration of migrants is unsatisfactory; the black or grey economy is too large 
and relies almost entirely on illegal migrants, and so on. The litany of complaints 
and challenges can be extended ad libitum, but this is not the place to do it. 
Reduced to its barest essentials the problem of globalisation can be nicely 
expressed in the costs per production hour worked in a factory: for a western 
European country such as the Netherlands that figure is 25 Euro, near the border 
between Germany and Poland about 16 Euro, in Brazil 4, and in India and China 
not more than 1 Euro. That this forces the region to reform is widely recognised On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 
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and accepted. Even so, most governments find it extremely difficult, if not 
downright impossible, to have an agenda for reform agreed to. Trade unions insist 
on maintaining acquired rights and opposing political forces make a clear choice 
for one approach or the other largely illusory. Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism is 
welcomed by some, but seen as going against the grain of the best European 
social welfare traditions by others. In view of the need to maintain financial 
stability and to refrain from enlarging the national debt, certainly within the Euro 
zone, there is precious little scope to reallocate funds in support of costly pro-
natal policies. On the contrary; in search of saving opportunities employers may 
even seek to reduce childcare expenditure, while governments will find it difficult 
to maintain, let alone increase, the entitlements of working parents. ‘Becoming a 
parent in Europe’ is unlikely to become easier; that may have to await renewed 
economic growth a decade or so away. 
 
The outcome of pro-natal policies is in doubt 
Changes in fertility are customarily attributed to social change. That is to say, to a 
combination of changes in economic and social structure, in technology, or in the 
culture of a society. Frequently it is instructive to build the arguments for the 
motivation of the decline of fertility after the mid-1960s largely on only one or 
two of these, for example by arguing that improved contraception had a catalytic 
influence in a situation characterised by value change. Nevertheless, if the 
prospect of pro-natal policies is discussed it is necessary to recognise that pro-
natal policies may, at least in theory, use all three areas as their point of impact. 
Examples from the past are: prohibiting the production, advertising and sale of 
condoms, equating sterilisation with causing grievous bodily harm, disallowing 
abortion, introducing and increasing child benefits, marriage premiums, or 
pension provisions favourable to parents, decorating particularly prolific mothers, 
appealing to the people’s love for the nation (“La France a besoin d’enfants”), 
and so on. Research into the effectiveness of pro-natal measures has yielded 
varied results and authors tend to complain about the methodological problems in 
assessing them (Ekert 1986; Höhn and Schubnell 1986; Klinger 1990; Gauthier 
1996). It would appear, though, that in addition to influencing the timing of births 
a modest increase in ultimate family size may on occasion occur, while more 
recently a direct effect of policy changes on fertility behaviour has sometimes 
been established (Teitelbaum 1972; Hoem 1993; Hoem et al. 2001; Dalla Zuana 
and Marzia 2005). Even so, no one can with any degree of certainty specify which 
approach offers the best perspective and whether it is cost-effective. On the basis 
of the results of a Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) recently carried 
out in Germany, Dorbritz (2004: 324) concludes that even if a whole series of 
currently advocated family policies were introduced this would not necessarily 
lead to an increase in the number of births. Most, more precisely 66%, of the 
respondents would simply see it as making it easier for them to fulfill the 
extremely low wish for children [1.74 amongst women and 1.57 for men] they Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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have. As sub-replacement family size ideals have earlier emerged in the German-
speaking world (Goldstein et al. 2003), the drive in human populations to 
procreate may long have been over-estimated. Whether the German speakers will 
prove to be trendsetters in this regard or will remain the exception, as other PPAS 
results in Europe suggest, is a moot point. It may, obviously and for all sorts of 
reasons, be a good thing to introduce family policies enabling couples to combine 
work and parenthood. But can demographers really recommend them because of 
their assured, direct pro-natal effect? It would seem that for demographers and 
policy makers alike the well-known political adage, ‘when in doubt, abstain’ is a 
reasonable position to take. In any case, the analysis undertaken by Schultheis 
(1990) for France suggests that it really is only a broad pro-natal effort, not too 
concerned with cost-effectiveness and sustained for many decades, that is likely 
to have a lasting effect on the quantum of fertility. As such a large-scale and 
sustained national effort would, obviously, need to be legitimised by wide support 
in all social, ethnic, and political groupings in society. The French policy 
approach is not simply transferable to other national settings, for in that country 
successive armed conflicts with a large neighbour have instilled a particularly 
strong feeling about the importance of maintaining its numerical strength 
 
The past mainly yielded lamentable examples   
The shadows of the past make a dispassionate public discussion of the pros and 
cons of pro-natal policies an unattractive proposition. For politicians little is to be 
gained by broaching the subject. And indeed, if one lists the countries that at one 
time during their history made a serious effort to increase fertility the impression 
of a strong association with authoritarianism is unavoidable: Germany and Italy, 
during fascism; GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the like during 
communism. Are explicit pro-natal policies incompatible with the principles 
adhered to in democratic societies and is a plea for their introduction tantamount 
to inviting the government to become more authoritarian? That would certainly be 
overstating the case and the dangers: think of France, Singapore, and Sweden. At 
the same time one wonders whether these three examples do not confirm that a 
specific national strategy, great national pride, a broad national consensus, a 
strong central government, and a population willing to accept its authority in the 
matter, are pre-requisites for introducing explicit pro-natal policies? In each of 
these cases the reasons for the easy acceptance of pro-natal policies are readily 
understood given the country’s history and position in the world. Even so, it is not 
inappropriate to recall that from the 1930s through the 1970s in Sweden, where 
the eugenics movement traditionally had great influence, around 62 000 persons, 
90% of whom were females, were coerced into accepting sterilisation, or were 
sterilised without their consent, because they were considered to be unfit to raise 
children. This was by no means an exception. A web search suggests that many 
more countries or states – such as Norway, Finland and the United States (North On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 
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Carolina, for example) – followed practices now considered quite unacceptable 
and a violation of human rights.  
 
The process of social change will continue 
The process of social change never stops. As demographers are well aware it is 
the rapid succession of generations and cohorts that enables the indefinite 
continuation of that process.  As the level of fertility is likely to change under the 
influence of social change this implies that one should not consider current levels 
to be immutable. In fact, it is precisely the essential characteristic of fertility 
under the impact of the Second Demographic Transition that should alert one to 
the probability of further change. For its most crucial element is that people 
determine the number of their children in full freedom and using all means of 
perfect birth control. Typically they will weigh a large number of factors before 
deciding to try and conceive a child or an additional child. In that sense fertility 
can best be described as a ‘derivative’. When partners perceive that the benefits—
especially the way in which their life will be enriched—outweigh the 
(opportunity) costs they tend to commit themselves remarkably fully to a positive 
decision. Sophisticated women will then stop using the pill or another effective 
contraceptive, start taking folium acid tablets against spina bifida instead, and 
after a few months attempt to conceive. Conceptions are meant to be self-
fulfilling for the couple or individual. Of course, the process does not always 
unfold in this particular way and ‘accidents happen’. But now that the mean age at 
birth has risen to 30 or so it is fair to assume that a great many of the potential 
parents will be experienced lovers and contraceptors. From the very low levels of 
fertility currently observed one may conclude that at the moment having children 
does not rate highly in the value system. In surveys respondents will give as their 
reason for not wanting a (further) child that they have not found the right partner, 
are concerned about the future which awaits children, or that in view of the high 
costs of children they prefer to maintain their standard of living. As Dalla Zuana 
(2004) recently observed for Italy, people ‘…are strongly oriented towards 
consumer goods connected with the quality of life in the home’. But values and 
perceptions may change. If at one time they were to conclude that actually raising 
a couple of children is preferable, more fashionable or prestigious, they would be 
entirely free to act on that preference. 
If one follows what a number of leading politicians and political 
commentators drive at in their speeches, columns and books, it seems as if change 
is in the air. During a political debate on German TV an obviously well-respected 
professor stated brazenly: ‘Die Gesellschaft ist marode, und die Familie ist 
marode’, without being attacked fiercely. The Prime Minister of the Netherlands, 
Jan Peter Balkenende tried to make ‘norms and values’ the central theme of the 
half-year his country had the Presidency of the European Union in 2004. The 
British physician and publicist Theodore Dalrymple is, furthermore, quite 
outspoken in his condemnation of instant gratification, sexual freedom, extra-Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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marital fertility, one-parent families and similar phenomena. Blaming the 1960s 
for all the things that have gone wrong in our societies has, more generally, 
become a favourite pastime. Whether the pendulum will swing back is difficult to 
tell, but there can be little doubt that neo-conservative forces are gaining in 
strength.   
It is, further, essential to understand that the demographic regime change 
frequently described as a second transition is still underway. Postponement of 
births testifies to that and by itself is a clear manifestation of an ongoing process. 
The societies concerned have not only failed to devise ways that would make 
becoming a parent and combining that with a job more attractive. They have also 
failed to devise a strategy for dealing effectively with the integration of 
immigrants and the problem of international migration more generally. The 
efforts now forced upon them to make the labour market less rigid, to change 
employment conditions, ‘to get the economy going again’, and so forth, are bound 
to influence the regime change by affecting fertility decisions. Once our societies 
have gained a new sense of direction, more stable and sustainable demographic 
patterns may emerge. 
 
The international demographic setting requires restraint  
Another 3 billion men and women will, it would seem from probability 
projections published in Nature by Wolfgang Lutz and his colleagues (2003), be 
added to the world’s population before natural growth has come to an end. In the 
foreseeable future the world will experience absolutely no shortage of people 
prepared to fill vacancies that might arise elsewhere. In all likelihood a steady 
stream of migrants will move towards the industrialised countries; in fact, they 
already are competing for talent! So, even if natural growth rates are negative, 
population loss will be the exception rather than the rule. In a purely demographic 
sense this phenomenon makes the situation in many countries less dramatic than a 
projection of natural growth suggests. Politicians and policy makers in quite a 
few, if not in all industrialised countries, have to take into account that part of the 
electorate may be strongly opposed to trying to raise the growth rate of the 
national population. These argue that the Western region would be better off with 
fewer people; that population decline is advantageous from an environmental 
point of view, and that international solidarity requires restraint on the part of the 
highly industrialised countries. They feel that Western countries should not 
advocate fertility decline in one part of the world and stimulate an increase in the 
number of births at home. In their view the population at large acts more sensibly 
than demographers advocating pro-natal policies. The argument that, in principle, 
there is nothing incongruent in a situation in which, in order to fulfill their main 
responsibilities, certain governments find they will have to stimulate fertility 
while others conclude that a lower level of fertility would be desirable, does not 
appeal to them. And neither are they impressed by the conclusion that migrants 
cannot be a substitute for births. In their view the joint effort of all nations is On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 
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needed to put a halt to natural population growth and thus to safeguard the long-
term future and bio-diversity of the earth. This approach to future population 
growth is not based on demographic considerations; it is primarily a reflection of 
the feeling that the world would be a better place to live in if there were fewer 
people. Perhaps it also is an expression of awareness of the so frequently 
highlighted risks involved in further growth and of anxiety about the future of the 
coming generations. In fact, fear for the future of their children is a frequently 
advanced argument of people not wanting to have them or not to have an 
additional child. Certain groups appear to ignore or challenge the received ideas 
quite deliberately. For example, in the Netherlands the so-called ‘Club of Ten 
Million’, which reportedly is supported by a rich industrialist, has as its main 
objective the reduction of the country’s current population of 16 million or so to 
the 10 million mentioned in the name. This idea has now been floating around for 
decades; that it is not so easily accomplished does not seem to deter the club’s 
adherents.
2 In combination with emancipation movements that may feel their 
achievements threatened by policies perceived to be traditional and retrograde, 
these forces may amount to a formidable opposition. Politicians more interested 
in acquiring power than in attesting the farsightedness of their views may well 
feel deterred by that likely opposition and refrain from taking a strong stand 
regarding pro-natal policies.  
    
Fertility is largely beyond government control  
Restraint in interfering with fertility by means of explicit pro-natal policies is, 
finally, desirable because human reproduction may well be beyond a 
government’s direct influence. As a matter of fact the decline of fertility as such 
may be assumed to be closely related to value changes in society that researchers 
have described as the shift from materialism to post-materialism, or also from 
modernism to post-modernism, to late-modernism, or reflexive modernism 
(Bertens 1995; Inglehart 1997). Whatever term one may prefer, this new stage in 
industrialised societies is characterised by a distrust of meta-narratives: of the 
great stories that underpinned societal progress and gave them a common 
purpose. The idea that the swarm may have priority over the bee is not at all 
common. To a considerable extent people have lost faith in the governments that 
represent them. They are wary of motives and promises. This has made the 
traditional administrative operating system obsolete. The time that governments 
and politicians could use an advantage in knowledge and power to broker a 
compromise between the desirable and practical and then enforce a specific 
                                                 
2   During deliberations about the draft Report of the Royal Commission on Population in the 
Netherlands in the early 1970s it was, for example, forcibly expressed by Nobel prize-winning 
economist Jan Tinbergen and his colleague Jan Pen, also an economist of repute. Very recently, 
when in a literary journal the latter reminisced about that exchange of views, he recalled that he 
had learned a great deal about demography when I reacted by saying that he would need a 
machine gun to achieve his stated goal of halving the population (Pen 2006).  Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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course of action has passed, as the political scientist Herman van Gunsteren 
argued in a address to the Social Science Council at the Royal Academy in 
Amsterdam. The gap between the population and its elected representatives is 
wide. Attempts to narrow and bridge it through referenda and hearings have been 
particularly unsuccessful. The ‘no’ vote in France and the Netherlands on the 
European constitutional treaty is a striking example. It occurred against the very 
outspoken wishes of the president/prime minister, the unwavering support of the 
leaders of the major political parties, and even the positive advice of the chairs of 
the trade unions. That the electorate is quick to vote in large numbers for flash-in-
the-pan politicians similarly demonstrates a marked dissatisfaction with the 
present state of affairs. Van Gunsteren rightly argues that a better way forward is 
for governments to move from an operating system based on Analysis and 
Instruction to one based on Diversity and Selection. They will have to leave room 
for diversity and personal choice. The major challenge is to select which 
developments should be supported and which should be discouraged. Making 
decisions of this type presupposes having a clear set of values.  
However, it is precisely in our post-modern, newly unordered societies, that 
reaching political agreement on such a set of values is terribly difficult. Major 
sections of the population differ in their views on the degree of freedom people 
should have. Some see run-away individualism and too much permissiveness as 
having disastrous consequences for the least educated and skilled sectors of the 
population. They would want to discourage cohabitation by refusing to pay social 
benefits to single parents and by stating clearly that births within marriage are to 
be preferred to extra-marital births. Against that, others plea for further 
emancipation and personal freedom: allow same-sex marriages, equalise the legal 
position of marriage and cohabitation, encourage, and pay for, in vitro fertilisation 
of single women, and the like. How does one under such circumstances reach 
agreement on which population policies would meet their essential objective of 
contributing to the wellbeing of the population and which would detract from it?  
 
5  Are Indirect Pro-natal Policies the Answer? 
 
In response to arguments such as sketched above, proponents of policy measures 
aimed at raising fertility advocate an indirect approach. In a sense they suggest 
introducing a new type of population policies:  Policies taken with demographic 
intent but cognizant of their assumed beneficial effect for individual citizens and 
society as a whole. The list of options governments may have in this regard is 
long. What they amount to is promoting births through policies relating to the 
school system, working hours, employment, housing, tax transfers, 
intergenerational transfers, and the like. Such policies, it is argued, should support 
couples and individuals by enabling them a wider range of choice and, more 
specifically, in having the number of children they want and at the time they want On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 
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(Frejka and Sardon 2005; Lutz and Skirbekk 2005). By not aiming at fertility 
directly but at the institutional and social environment in which couples make 
their decision, they hope to see fertility rise and/or couples decide for children 
earlier in their lives. However, cash payments at the time of birth of a child or 
targeted at certain demographic characteristics of the family may be included. In 
many respects the proposed measures are best characterised as family support 
policies and in discourse the distinction between explicit policies pro-natal 
policies and birth-promoting policies of this new type commonly is blurred. The 
basic assumption underlying this indirect approach is that according to their 
expressed views in surveys couples would like to have more children than they 
have. While they may wish to have two on average, they stop well short of that 
ideal. Why not create the institutional arrangements that would enable them to 
realise their wishes as it is also desirable from a societal perspective?   
In an impressive series of papers Peter McDonald (2000; 2002; 2005) has 
highlighted the principles upon which ‘family support policies should be based’. 
Almost unavoidably such principles have a clear ideological component; more 
specifically, this view on society expounds values such as gender neutrality and 
generational equity; full workforce participation as seen as a normal state of 
affairs. Nevertheless, in many respects this indirect approach to stimulating 
fertility seems more promising than the direct approach. One may well argue that 
it will help completing the regime change underway since the mid-1960s and is 
necessary in enabling people to combine the role of active participant on the 
labour market with that of parent. Sweden, and more generally the Scandinavian 
countries, is then presented as a country where the new realities of family life 
have been handled so successfully that fertility can be maintained close to 
replacement level. 
However, from a government’s point of view the indirect approach also has 
some serious drawbacks. Aside from the fact that the outcome of indirect 
measures is more difficult to assess than that of direct measures and may also be 
less effective, its main weakness is uncertainty about the validity of the 
underlying assumption. Is it really reasonable to assume that removing obstacles 
to combining the parental and labour force roles will result in higher fertility? 
Does not the experience from the past show that women will use better 
circumstances and enlarged options primarily to increase their labour force 
participation? And, is it really likely that couples will use improvements in their 
living conditions to have (more) children rather than to spend funds on other 
priorities? Can one really maintain that the competition of other priorities such as 
holidaying, improving the house and its installations, or following one’s soccer 
club to the corners of Europe, will be much reduced as a result of the sort of 
measures proposed? No doubt, young couples will welcome the prospect of 
receiving approval of society for being prepared to fulfill the role of parent and of 
collecting some compensation for costs incurred. But will it allay the fears for the 
future of their children? And will they, as Dorbritz (2004) reported, see it as more Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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than something making their life somewhat easier? Would it really bring them to 
having a baby or another baby? And, will couples and individuals that have 
decided to remain voluntary childless change their mind in view of beckoning 
rewards? The list of rhetorical questions can easily be extended. But that is not the 
point. Posing them suffices to illustrate that demographers would have difficulty 
in answering such straightforward questions unambiguously. The central issue is, 
of course, whether people have so few children by default or by design. 
Another drawback is the costs of the proposed measures. Some steps, as 
McDonald has rightly stressed, can be taken in a budgetary neutral way. 
Politicians can, for example, decide that children should in principle have access 
to their school from 7 o’clock in the morning to 6:30 in the evening. Who should 
look after them there: unpaid volunteers? There can be no doubt that a revision of 
institutional and social arrangements in society to promote childbirth will be a 
costly affair. And since, as discussed earlier, economic restructuring and reforms 
need to have priority over policies pro-natal in content, it is doubtful that the 
monies required will be forthcoming. The so-called Scandinavian model 
presupposes that governments pay from the public purse what in other countries 
people would have to pay for themselves. Obviously they can only do that by first 
collecting the necessary funds. As Scharpf (2000) has highlighted this is 
problematic. As regards corporate taxes governments find themselves engaged in 
what has been characterised as a ‘race to the bottom’. To attract firms, and out of 
fear that others will simply move part of their activity to another country—
reportedly Microsoft has a branch in Ireland to receive the revenues from the 
international sale of software to save on taxes—they are intent on continually 
offering them the best possible tax conditions. Provisional OECD statistics for 
2004 show that with 50.7 % Sweden had the highest tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP in all OECD nations, with Denmark (49.6), Norway (44.9) and Finland 
(44.3) all being amongst the top 5. As tax relief for families is not included in this 
figure but cash transfers are this does not tell the whole story. Even so, whether 
other countries will move towards the ‘Scandinavian model’ instead of in the 
direction of greater liberalisation is a moot point. The more so since Birgitta 
Swedenborg, a well-known Swedish economist has, just as in the mid-1990s, 
recently exposed several weaknesses in the Swedish model. It is by no means free 
of problems, sharing with other countries the unsuccessful integration of migrants 
and minimal wages that are too high in the global setting. Hidden unemployment 
is marked, and if unemployment benefits and the costs of health insurance rise, 
family benefits are likely to come under pressure.  
Opting for or against the so-called ‘Scandinavian model’ is a political 
decision. But, political parties in most European societies are sharply divided on 
the issue of how best to face the future: neo-liberalism or renewed socialism? 
Even if a ‘Third Way’ is being tried strong majorities are rare. The proportion of 
parliamentary votes frequently remains roughly in equilibrium so that, unless the 
outcome of an election leaves no other choice than to form a grand coalition, the On Low Fertility and the Prospect of Pro-natal Policies 
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process of structural and institutional reform that could encompass and revise 
family policies will presumably make very slow progress only.  
One may conclude from all this that from a government’s or politician’s 
perspective many of the practical obstacles in the way of explicit pro-natal 
policies apply equally to the indirect approach of promoting births. 
 
6  Which Way Forward? 
 
The list of arguments discussed above poses the question whether there is any 
way forward? How does one deal with a fertility decline to such a low level that 
the size of future generations of men and women will be not much more than half 
of those now economically active. If governments on very good grounds are 
concerned about lowest-low fertility and feel they would be remiss in their duty if 
no action were taken, what could they do? What would be the best way forward?  
The first task, presumably, would be to raise awareness. Demographers, 
economists and other scholars have an important role to play in this regard in that 
they should provide the impartial information on which both governments and 
citizens can rely. They should point to research findings as those of Neels (2005) 
who recently established for Belgium that the economic factors play a more 
important role in influencing the frequency of births with low rank numbers while 
ideational factors have the greatest influence concerning the higher rank numbers 
and the shifts in marriage patterns. They should, similarly, point to research 
findings obtained through analysis of policy acceptance surveys in countries 
characterised by ‘weak’ as well as ‘strong’ families (Micheli and Dalla Zuana 
2004). They should also refer to studies about increasing voluntary childlessness, 
for example the recent findings presented by Dorbritz (op. cit., 324) who noted 
that pro-natal measures such as a single financial bonus for the birth of a child 
were of little interest to his respondents. They should, in addition, explore ways of 
alleviating the impact of low fertility by simulating varying levels of immigration 
and emigration, changes in labour force participation, levels of part-time 
employment, and the like. Governments intent on halting or reversing the trend in 
fertility will, secondly, have to investigate which possible actions: 
i.  Would be valuable in themselves and might contribute to the desired effect, 
ii.  Would not be discriminatory as regards social class, race, religion and such 
other factors as are enshrined in a country’s Constitution,  
iii.  Would respect the internationally agreed upon right of individuals and 
couples to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children, 
iv.  Would appeal to broad sections of the population and not solely to those 
few age groups likely to benefit temporarily from them, 
v.  Would be seen to be of direct and long-term benefit to society and the 
formation of  the coming generations, Dirk J. van de Kaa 
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vi.  Would, in all likelihood, aid the completion of the demographic regime 
change currently underway and would be sustainable in the foreseeable 
future, 
vii.  Would, consequently, probably receive broad political support. 
 
This identifies investing in the coming generations as possibly the best way 
forward. According to some futurologists, industrialised nations will have to meet 
international competition by raising the future elite as best they can. Every 
opportunity to develop themselves should be offered to young men and women 
who have the talents to invent new techniques, and to see new opportunities from 
which society as a whole may benefit. Not numbers of children will be the 
decisive factor for the common future but the quality and level of education of 
those that are born. Parents like to see their children do well. In fact, a great deal 
of hope and expectation is commonly vested in them. This especially in a 
situation where conceptions have to be self-fulfilling, where after much 
deliberation the advantages of having a (further) child are perceived as 
outweighing the disadvantages, and conceiving mostly requires the conscious 
decision to interrupt contraception. Policies concentrating on the formation, 
education and training of children until they reach adulthood would seem to meet 
the list of criteria. Raising children with a hunger for knowledge, a sense of 
adventure and endeavour, confidently looking forward to face international 
competition, and intent on making the most of opportunities offered, might be a 
better policy option than trying to increase their numbers. No doubt, such 
measures are expensive. But investments in education, training, and research 
commonly yield good returns. This might help reaching political agreements. Our 
societies are bound to benefit immensely from young generations with a 
confidence and attitude commensurate with that of the young in China, India, 
other parts of Asia and, more generally, in the developing world. And, at the very 
least, it would brighten the prospects of these coming generations themselves 
while conveying to potential parents that society at large would be appreciative of 
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